TS/SCI

Many “ignorant” folks (I include bloggers, news, news commentators, etc.) are reporting, commenting, sharing, and otherwise just making me cry tears of despair over this mess with the TS/SCI documents found at Mar-A-Lago, Mr. Trump’s home abode. I have something to say to all of you who know nothing about this situation but insist on reporting your thoughts. I’ve been waiting on some “well-known” reporter or someone with some journalistic sense — to look into this process — instead — everyone wants to politicize it. Yay.

Image abstracted from NATO Archives:

(Someone knew I had been in the military and asked me why this brouhaha about the classified documents. My answer is that TS/SCI is not just any “classified” material.)

I held a TS/SCI clearance — and I rarely saw TS/SCI because I did not have a “need to know.” Many of us, in communications, with the clearance, never got near that level of classified, but it was a possibility.

Even the comm centers were separated at the TS level. TS/SCI had separate transmission equipment and site — it was located with the Intel folks on the USAF base. There was also a separate comm center for Operations/Pilots — but that was because of the messages’ immediacy and topic (e.g., missions to fly). The base comm center received UNCLASSIFIED/ FOUO/ CONFIDENTIAL/ SECRET/ TOP SECRET messages for the entire base (exceptions noted before). The folks in communications worked in all three and the rarer field operations comms.

I guess you might say the classifications were classified. It was all “Information (that was) Specially Compartmentalized” away from the rest of the classified materials. Since Top Secret was on the level of causing extreme damage to National Security — it was hard to fathom how TS/SCI could be higher level.

I was a custodian (an additional duty job) — I had to know all the rules about protecting it, including the one that sounds obvious but is not always kept by many — “don’t read it” if you have it and don’t have a “need to know.” That was written but only enforced by honor. At least, be smart enough to keep it yourself — if you read it.

Any classified documents I had weren’t really in my “possession” — they were kept in TS/SCI qualified secure areas (inside a safe, inside of the protected area). Each document had a control number. The control number might be the date/time/originator of a message — and maybe subject — and though I view that data and all the page numbers to the end — to ensure it’s all there — I still don’t go through the document and read it. But I must verify the documents in the safe every time I open it.

If it’s “Two-Man” control on top of/or else different than TS/SCI (more sensitive) — I would appoint two (pre-approved officers) to come in to open the safe — with two different combinations — then I would guide them through an inventory when the safe is opened — I mark down on a control card on the outside of my safes — the date, time, and my initials upon opening, and the Two-Man team initials on the safes with Two-man materials. Additionally, all of our initials are prerecorded in a control document. And signatures, as well.

If an officer came in and wanted to check out a document to read — I had to go through the control documents to verify security clearance — and “need to know.” And the Two-Man team had to as well. (Note: before you ask — it’s OK for three people to handle Two-Man control documents — it’s an absolute No-No for one person alone to take it. It was one of the aspects of my job at the time. I was very embarrassed at how the officers understood so little — I had to hold their hands the whole way practically. Some understood, but the pilots, those jocks, could be the worst kids).

It was not enough to have the clearance. That was true of all classified materials, but we didn’t have to verify the need to know — if the document belonged to another organization and was not designated TS/SCI — we, in my career field, communications, were the keepers of the classified documents transferring from base to base. The encryption codes to keep the records safe when transmitting them (this was pre-Internet time).

We were also the keepers of the security regulations and security training. We had to get them out, read them once a quarter, and sign off that we read them. It was in our best interest to understand what we were reading. If we make a mistake — and we signed off agreeing we knew we were “not supposed to make that mistake” — the onus of burden was on us. The burden was on the supervisor if we made a mistake and had not signed off on the security regulations and training. :-) And it was very controlled.

As a designated custodian, I was ultimately responsible for tracking the documents. And NO TS/SCI material was untracked — as I said, they had control numbers — and a sign-out sheet. You never discard the sign-out sheet. If the information is leaked or lost, a security investigator will want to know who has handled the document. And I better prove I checked their ID cards and “need to know” (even if I knew them — because what if they were in trouble and wanted something to bargain with?).

1. It can’t be possible that the FBI planted those documents because there would be a “paper trail” showing they had checked them out. If the FBI snuck them out, then there would be all kinds of triggers going off. It would require much covering up — all the way up the channel ↑ and across ↔ many channels.
2. The FBI used a warrant and made a spectacle of the whole situation because they had already approached Mr. Trump (discreetly) and tried to get the documents back. They were not accusing him of anything — the documents require special safekeeping and control. Upon the second time they approached — they were informed by Mr. Trump’s rep that there were no classified docs in his possession at Mar-A-Lago.
3. The reason why Mr. Trump could not have “declassified” them (at least legally speaking — he certainly can “try”) is that TS/SCI is not the classified materials Obama was talking about when he said it was a Presidents job to declassify documents. It doesn’t fall into the same category as classified materials. If it did — it would be just called “classified” documents. The classification level is usually a moot point in many cases — until it’s TS/SCI.
4. The FBI does not need to raid/investigate Carter/Reagan/Bush/Clinton/Bush/Obama, and now Biden is because all of those past presidents read. They not only read, but they had people advising them. Trump and everyone who knows him will openly admit that he does not “read.” Not the other way around.
5. This truth in 4. above begs the question, why did he take it to his personal home — was it an act of espionage? Nah, Mr. Trump is just too out of it to pull anything like that off.

See, spying is considered dangerous and challenging for a reason. The United States government doesn’t leave documents unattended — they are controlled. Even the FOUO. The spies (in the past, caught and convicted) that committed treason already had access to these types of documents.

This entire faux pax on Mr. Trump’s part would be much better handled if he just came out and said, “Yeah, gee, I guess I didn’t really read the security regulations I was required to read. My bad. Here ya go. I kept them safe, anyway, OK?”

What is interesting to note, my guess is that someone else signed his signature to the control documents, or these days maybe they use fingerprints, iris scanning, who knows…and that someone (probably Jared) will be thrown under the bus. More than likely, he probably didn’t know what he had when he took those documents home. They probably just crammed everything into boxes, and BOOM.

Additional reading — if you want to understand more.

All of my experiences were pre-computers. Even when the USAF started getting desktop computers — 1988? — information that was classified was not kept on computers ATT* due to the ease with which they could be attacked/ hacked/ listened to. Why do you think “pencil whipping” was a well-used phrase back then? :-)

*(sorry, the urge to use acronyms has overcome me — At That Time)

There had been no studies completed yet to authorize computers for classified processing — when I left the USAF (1992) — except for the one document/research/analysis I wrote during Desert Shield/Storm in Turkey. This document I created to allow officers to use a laptop — but not connect to any transmission device — out in the field — but only up to Confidential and Secret. Top Secret was off limits, and TS/SCI wasn’t even on the table. It went up to USAFE, was approved, and then shared throughout. So if you were “there” and you were using a laptop with floppy drives only — that might have been because of me!

Did you know the electronic signals of each tap of each key can be discerned by “The Third Man,” who is “Always Listening?”. For example, the “a” key which is hit by the pinky, a relatively weak digit on your hand, sounds differently than the “j” key, which is tapped by the right-hand index finger (probably the strongest finger). This was well documented in a field/topic called TEMPEST. At the time, I knew it — it was a classified term. It’s on Wikipedia now.

By the way, TS/SCI is Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information. Essentially the classification is higher than plain TS, and the information is for specially designated “topics” (compartmented information). Back then, electric typewriters were used — and even those typewriters had been well studied before being approved. My document was turned into a security regulation and passed around USAFE. That’s because I did intense research on all the requirements — and on how computers emanated when not connected to a transmission device (if at all).

Long before my time, or maybe sometime during my time, who knows — engineers and technicians sat down and figured this out. So let’s say that the typewriter “emanations” can be picked up with a …RF listening device or even Bluetooth (which didn’t exist back then). All the listening device is doing is picking up the signal. The “Third Man” still has to sit down and decode it.

Classified approved typewriters had to be used in buildings secured a certain way and a certain number of feet away from outside walls. The building had to be a certain number of feet from the borders of the base, etc…etc…etc…and then the person using it had to have a clearance, etc…There was a lot to go into the classification of documents, topics, and devices used to protect them, create them, or transmit them. I’ll never be able to cram 6–8 years of security training and knowledge into one Medium article — so I’ve given examples to understand the situation’s complexity.